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Descartes’s use of  words and phrases, which is the most significant for understanding his various 
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indicate the varied status of  the cogito, such as ‘haec cognitio, ego cogito, ergo sum’, ‘hanc propositionem, ego 
cogito, ergo sum’, ‘hanc conclusionem: cogito, ergo sum’, and so on; Descartes changes carefully the terms 
in each of  the cogito arguments. By focusing on these terms, I try to interpret Descartes’s explanations 
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    This paper seeks to bring an end to the interpretative dispute on Descartes’s cogito: is the 
cogito known by intuition or by inference? There have been several studies based on both analytical 
and historical approaches to the dispute, and it seems that we have exhausted all interpretations. 
Nevertheless, I wish to revisit this dispute, as it appears that the previous studies have overlooked 
Descartes’s use of  words and phrases, which is the most significant for understanding his various 
discourses on the cogito consistently.  
* * * 
After what is termed the methodological doubt, which denies the reliability of  the sense, 
the existence of  the external world, and the certainty of  the mathematical knowledge, Descartes1 
                                                        
1  In accordance with current practice, I use the following abbreviation for the standard edition of  
Descartes’s works:  
AT: René DESCARTES, Œuvres de Descartes, 11 vols., edited by Charles Adam and Paul Tannery (Paris: 
Vrin, 1964-74).  
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states ‘I am thinking, therefore I exist’2 (the cogito). For him, the cogito is ‘the first and most certain 
of  all’ and ‘the first principle of  the philosophy’ (D.M., CSM-I, 195); its certainty cannot depend 
on any general proposition, for if  it depended on a general proposition, such as ‘Everything 
which thinks exists’, that should have been stated as the first principle; therefore, the cogito cannot 
depend on any general proposition. Descartes writes:  
 
When someone says, ‘I am thinking, therefore I am, or I exist’, he does not deduce existence 
from thought by means of  a syllogism, but recognizes it as something self-evident by a simple 
intuition of  the mind. This is clear from the fact that if  he were deducing it by means of  a 
syllogism, he would have to have had previous knowledge of  the major premiss ‘Everything 
which thinks is, or exists’; yet in fact he learns it from experiencing in his own case that it is 
impossible that he should think without existing. It is in the nature of  our mind to construct 
general propositions on the basis of  our knowledge of  particular ones. (2ae Resp., AT-VII, 140–
41; CSM-II, 100) 
 
On the other hand, there are some explanations that seem to admit that the cogito has a 
premise. For example, Discourse on Method states: ‘[T]here is nothing at all in the proposition ‘I am 
thinking, therefore I exist’ to assure me that I am speaking the truth, except that I see very clearly that 
in order to think it is necessary to exist’ (D.M., AT-VI, 33; CSM-I, 127). Some commentators believe 
that this passage admits that the certainty of  the cogito depends on the general proposition ‘In 
order to think it is necessary to exist’.3 If  so, it follows that this is contrary to the passages which 
state that the cogito is a primary notion not derived by means of  any syllogism (2ae Resp., AT-VII, 
140–141; CSM-II, 100/Letter to Clerselier, AT-IX, 205; CSM-II, 271).  
Based on these contradictions, many commentators have admitted that there is an 
inconsistency in Descartes’s explanation about the cogito; however, I would like to argue that there 
is no inconsistency. In order to do this, I focus on the terms which Descartes uses to indicate the 
varied status of  the cogito, such as ‘haec cognitio, ego cogito, ergo sum’ (AT-VIII, 7), ‘hanc 
propositionem, ego cogito, ergo sum’ (ibid., 8), ‘hanc conclusionem: cogito, ergo sum’ (AT-V, 147), and so 
on; Descartes carefully changes the terms in each of  the cogito arguments. Focusing on these terms, 
                                                        
I refer to the following translations:  
CSM: René DESCARTES, The Philosophical Writings of  Descartes, vol. 1–2, translated by John Cottingham, 
Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).  
CSMK: René DESCARTES, The Philosophical Writings of  Descartes, vol. 3, translated by John Cottingham, 
Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch, and Anthony Kenny (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1985). 
2 ‘I am, I exist’ in Meditations on First Philosophy.  
3 Martial GUEROULT, Descartes selon l’ordre des raisons, vol. 2 (Paris: Aubier, 1953), 310; Bernard WILLIAMS, 
‘The Certainty of  the Cogito’, in Descartes: A Collection of  Critical Essays, ed. Willis Doney (London; 
Melbourne: Macmillan, 1968), 91–92.  
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I try to consistently interpret Descartes’s explanations, which may appear inconsistent at a glance.  
 
 
A Line of  Interpretation 
 
    This paper takes a historical, philological approach; that is, it tries to clarify the thoughts on 
the cogito presented by Descartes himself  and does not deal with any analytical argument.  
 
 
1. Texts  
 
    There are only two passages in all the works by Descartes himself  (that is, in all but 
Conversation with Burman), which suggest that the cogito is a logical conclusion deduced from some 
kind of  universal knowledge: in Discourse on Method and Principles of  Philosophy.4 In each of  them 
(A: Discourse; B: Principles), the statement ‘I am thinking, therefore I exist’ appears twice (in A1/A2; 
B1/B2), as cited below:  
 
  A1: But immediately I noticed that while I was trying thus to think everything false, it was necessary 
that I, who was thinking this, was something. And observing that this vérité ‘I am thinking, 
therefore I exist’ was so firm and sure that all the most extravagant suppositions of  the sceptics 
were incapable of  shaking it, I decided that I could accept it without scruple as the first 
principle of  the philosophy I was seeking. (D.M., AT-VI, 32; CSM-I, 127) 
 
  A2: After this I considered in general what is required of  a proposition in order for it to be true 
and certain; for since I had just found one [proposition] that I knew to be such, I thought 
that I ought also to know what this certainty consists in. I observed that there is nothing at all 
in the proposition ‘I am thinking, therefore I exist’ to assure me that I am speaking the truth, 
except that I see very clearly that in order to think it is necessary to exist. (ibid., AT-VI, 33; 
CSM-I, 127)  
 
  B1: In rejecting [...] everything which we can in any way doubt, it is easy for us to suppose that 
there is no God and no heaven, and that there are no bodies, and even that we ourselves have 
no hands or feet, or indeed any body at all. But we cannot for all that suppose that we, who are 
having such thoughts, are nothing. For it is a contradiction to suppose that what thinks does 
not, at the very time when it is thinking, exist. Accordingly, this cognitio ‘I am thinking, 
therefore I exist’ is the first and most certain of  all to occur to anyone who philosophizes in an 
orderly way. (P.Ph., AT-VIII, 7; CSM-I, 195)  
                                                        
4 Descartes writes in Search for Truth, “this inference [hujus ratiocinii], ‘I am doubting, therefore I exist’, or 
what amounts to the same thing, ‘I am thinking, therefore I exist’” (R.V., AT-X, 523; CSM-II, 417), but 




  B2: And when I said that the propositio ‘I am thinking, therefore I exist’ is the first and most 
certain of  all to occur to anyone who philosophizes in an orderly way, I did not in saying that 
deny that one must first know what thought, existence and certainty are, and that it is 
impossible that that which thinks should not exist, and so forth. (ibid., AT-VIII, 8; CSM-
I, 196)  
 
It is significant here that he never sets a logical premise to the cogito without calling it ‘proposition’, 
and vice versa. Moreover, when he refers to the cogito for the first time, he terms it vérité or cognitio 
and shows no antecedents of  it (A1/B1)5; on the other hand, when he refers to the cogito for the 
second time, he calls it proposition/propositio and shows its logical premise (A2/B2).6 In addition, 
the passages in the Second Reply and a letter to Clerselier suggest that Descartes is reluctant to 
consider ‘I am thinking, therefore I exist’ to be a proposition: 
 
    When someone says ‘I am thinking, therefore I am, or I exist’, he does not deduce existence 
from thought by means of  a syllogism, but recognizes it as something self-evident by a simple 
intuition of  the mind. This is clear from the fact that if  he were deducing it by means of  a 
syllogism, he would have to have had previous knowledge of  the major premiss ‘Everything 
which thinks is, or exists’; yet in fact he learns it from experiencing in his own case that it is 
impossible that he should think without existing. It is in the nature of  our mind to construct 
general propositions on the basis of  our knowledge of  particular ones [Ea enim est natura nostrae 
mentis, ut generales propositiones ex particularium cognitione efformet]. (2ae Resp., AT-VII, 
140–41; CSM-II, 100) 
 
Your friends note six objections against the Second Meditation. The first is this. The author of  
the Counter-Objections claims that when I say ‘I am thinking, therefore I exist’ I presuppose the 
                                                        
5 Wilson considers ‘it is a contradiction to suppose that what thinks does not, at the very time when it is 
thinking, exist’ (B1) as a premise to deduce the cogito. See: M. D. WILSON, Descartes (London; Boston: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982 [c1978]), 56. In my reading, however, this is not universal knowledge. We 
must note that Principles is written in the first-person plural perspective as a textbook; considering this point, 
‘it is a contradiction to suppose that what thinks does not, at the very time when it is thinking, exist’ 
corresponds to ‘I noticed that while I was trying thus to think everything false, it was necessary that I, who 
was thinking this, was something’ (D.M., CSM-I, 127), which is written in the first-person perspective, and 
“[someone who says ‘I am thinking, therefore I am, or I exist’] learns it from experiencing in his own case 
that it is impossible that he should think without existing” (2ae Resp., CSM-II, 100), which is written in the 
third-person perspective.  
6 Some commentators classify the descriptions of  the cogito by writing (the cogito in Discourse, the cogito in 
Meditations, the cogito in Principles, and so on); for example, Marion distinguishes the cogito in Meditations (‘I 
am, I exist’) from the cogito in the other writings (‘I am thinking, therefore I exist’). See: J.-L. MARION, 
Questions cartésiennes (Paris: P. U. F., 1996), 16–19. However, according to the circumstances I mentioned in 
the text, this seems insufficient; we need to further classify them by the context in every work.  
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major premiss ‘Whatever thinks exists’, and hence I have already adopted a preconceived opinion. 
[…] But the most important mistake our critic makes here is supposition that knowledge of  
particular propositions must always be deduced from universal ones [la connaissance des 
propositions particulières doit toujours être déduite des universelles], following the same 
order as that of  a syllogism in dialectics. (Letter to Clerselier [12 Jan. 1646], AT-IX, 205; CSM-II, 
271)  
 
These passages suggest an asymmetry between ‘I am thinking, therefore I exist’ and ‘Everything 
which thinks is, or exists/Whatever thinks exists’. Descartes calls ‘Everything which thinks is, or 
exists/Whatever thinks exists’ a general proposition, but does not state that the cogito is a particular 
proposition; he terms it knowledge of a particular thing or knowledge of a particular proposition; this 
means that Descartes carefully avoids using the term ‘proposition’ for the cogito. Why does 
Descartes refer to the cogito as a proposition in A2 and B2? In the subsequent section, I negotiate 
this problem by considering the difference between the cogito as vérité/cognitio and the cogito as 
proposition/propositio.  
In addition, we must take into consideration the passage in Conversation with Burman, which 
suggests that the cogito has an antecedent: 
 
Before this inference, ‘I am thinking, therefore I exist’, the major ‘whatever thinks exists’ can 
be known; for it is in reality prior to my inference, and my inference depends on it. This is why 
the author says in the Principles that the major premiss comes first, namely because implicitly it is 
always presupposed and prior. (Ent. Burm., AT-V, 147; CSMK-III, 333)  
 
Of  course, the fact that Conversation is not written by Descartes himself  is not a sufficient reason 
for disregarding it; I deal with this in the concluding section. 
 
 
2. The Cogito as Vérité/Cognitio and Cogito as Proposition/Propositio 
 
    In this section, I examine Discourse on Method and Principles of  Philosophy, referring to some 
other texts.  
 
Discourse on Method 
 
    I have already mentioned that the statement ‘I am thinking, therefore I am’ appears twice in 
Discourse; let us analyze the construction of  the argument in the text:  
 
  A1: But immediately I noticed that while I was trying thus to think everything false, it was necessary 
that I, who was thinking this, was something. And observing that this truth ‘I am thinking, 
therefore I exist’ was so firm and sure that all the most extravagant suppositions of  the sceptics 
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were incapable of  shaking it, I decided that I could accept it without scruple as the first 
principle of  the philosophy I was seeking. Next I examined attentively what I was. I saw that 
while I could pretend that I had no body and that there was no world and no place for me to 
be in, I could not for all that pretend that I did not exist. I saw on the contrary that from the 
mere fact that I thought of  doubting the truth of  other things, it followed quite evidently and 
certainly that I existed; whereas if  I had merely ceased thinking, even if  everything else I had 
ever imagined had been true, I should have had no reason to believe that I existed. From this 
I knew I was a substance whose whole essence or nature is simply to think, and which does 
not require any place, or depend on any material thing, in order to exist. (D.M., AT-VI, 32; 
CSM-I, 127) 
 
  A2: After this I considered in general what is required of  a proposition in order for it to be true 
and certain; for since I had just found one [proposition] that I knew to be such, I thought that 
I ought also to know what this certainty consists in. I observed that there is nothing at all in 
the proposition ‘I am thinking, therefore I exist’ to assure me that I am speaking the truth, 
except that I see very clearly that in order to think it is necessary to exist. (ibid., AT-VI, 33; 
CSM-I, 127) 
 
In A1, Descartes finds “this truth ‘I am thinking, therefore I exist”’ and determines the ‘I’ as ‘a 
substance whose whole essence or nature is simply to think’. We must note that A1 is fully sufficient 
to explain the essence of  the cogito, which is presented in the following works: (1) that even if  one can 
doubt everything, one cannot doubt the existence of  the ‘I’ who doubts everything, and (2) that the 
‘I’ is a substance whose nature is simply to think and does not depend on any material things (Med., 
CSM-II, 16-19; P.Ph., CSM-I, 194-196); that is, Descartes has already finished the cogito argument in 
A1. The problem, then, is how we should read A2.  
At first glance, it seems that in A2 Descartes reconsiders the cogito, which he found in A1, and 
attaches to it the premise ‘In order to think it is necessary to exist’.7 Strangely, however, while he 
considers the proposition ‘I am thinking, therefore I exist’ to be certain, Descartes admits that he does 
not know what this certainty consists in. Can one consider something to be the truth or the first 
principle without knowing what its certainty consists in? If  not, it follows that the cogito in A1 and the 
cogito in A2 are not the same, although they have the same expression.8 In fact, Descartes calls the 
former vérité and the latter proposition. Here, we must pay attention to the passage in A2 that ‘I 
considered in general what is required of  a proposition in order for it to be true and certain’. This 
means that the aim of  A2 is not to analyze reflectively what the certainty of  the cogito consists in, but 
                                                        
7 Gueroult distinguishes ‘In order to think it is necessary to exist’ from ‘Everything which thinks exists’ 
and regards the former to be a condition préalable or principe de la pensée which makes the relationship between 
‘I think’ and ‘I exist’ necessary. See: Martial GUEROULT, Descartes selon l’ordre des raisons, vol. 2 (Paris: Aubier, 
1953), 310.  
8 Accordingly, my reading, if  valid, will reject Priente’s hypothesis that ‘all of  the versions of  the cogito are 
equivalent’. See: Jean-Claude PARIENTE, ‘Le première personne et sa fonction dans le Cogito’, in Descartes et 
la question du sujet, ed. Kim Sang Ong-Van-Cung (Paris: P. U. F., 1999), 16.  
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to consider in general the requirement for some kind of  proposition being true and certain; moreover, 
the phrase ‘in general’ suggests that Descartes does not intend to consider the methodological doubt 
in A2; that is, the ‘I’ of  the cogito in A2 is not the subject who performs the methodological doubt and 
notices that while one is trying to think everything false, it is necessary that the ‘I’, who is thinking 
this, is something, but just a grammatical subject.9 In other words, in A2 Descartes separates the cogito 
from the metaphysical process of  the methodological doubt and deals with it not in the metaphysical 
context but in general; this is because he needs to introduce a general rule ‘that the things we conceive 
very clearly and very distinctly are all true’. In brief, the general proposition ‘In order to think it is 
necessary to exist’ is needed to introduce this general rule, but not essential to acquire the vérité of  the 
cogito.  
Furthermore, Descartes himself  realized that the description in A2 was misleading; in fact, he 
rephrased it and never used universal knowledge to introduce the same rule in Meditations:  
 
I am certain that I am a thinking thing. Do I not therefore also know what is required for my 
being certain about anything? In this first item of  knowledge, there is simply a clear and distinct 
perception of  what I am asserting; this would not be enough to make me certain of  the truth 
of  the matter if  it could ever turn out that something which I perceived with such clarity and 
distinctness was false. So I now seem to be able to lay it down as a general rule that whatever I 
perceive very clearly and distinctly is true. (Med., CSM-II, 24)  
 
Based on this, it seems impossible to sustain the deep-rooted interpretation that Descartes 
admits in Discourse that the general proposition ‘In order to think it is necessary to exist’ is needed 
as a principle of  thought to acquire the cogito. We must not confuse the argument on the cogito 
itself  (A1) with the argument on the general rule of  clear and distinct cognition (A2); in the 
former Descartes does not suggest general propositions to acquire the cogito.   
 
Principles of  Philosophy 
 
    Similar to Discourse, the cogito statement appears twice (in B1 and B2) in Principles: 
 
  B1: (Art. VII) In rejecting [...] everything which we can in any way doubt, it is easy for us to suppose 
that there is no God and no heaven, and that there are no bodies, and even that we ourselves 
have no hands or feet, or indeed any body at all. But we cannot for all that suppose that we, 
who are having such thoughts, are nothing. For it is a contradiction to suppose that what thinks 
does not, at the very time when it is thinking, exist. Accordingly, this piece of  knowledge ‘I am 
thinking, therefore I exist’ is the first and most certain of  all to occur to anyone who 
                                                        
9 Rosenthal writes, ‘[U]nderstanding some propositional content does not typically pin down the reference 
of  whatever token-reflexive components are involved. Understanding ‘Theaetetus is sitting’ does not 
determine the time that the present tense refers to; understanding ‘He gives it to her’ does not suffice to 
pick out any particular people or gift’. See: David M. ROSENTHAL, ‘Will and the Theory of  Judgment’, in 
Essays on Descartes’ Meditations, ed. Amélie Rorty (Berkeley: University of  California Press, 1986), 422.  
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philosophizes in an orderly way. (Art. VIII) This is the best way to discover the nature of  the 
mind and the distinction between the mind and the body. For if  we, who are supposing that 
everything which is distinct from us is false, examine what we are, we see very clearly that 
neither extension nor shape nor local motion, nor anything of  this kind which is attributable 
to a body, belongs to our nature, but that thought alone belongs to it. (P.Ph., AT-VIII, 7; CSM-
I, 195) 
 
  B2: (Art. X) And when I said that the proposition ‘I am thinking, therefore I exist’ is the first and 
most certain of  all to occur to anyone who philosophizes in an orderly way, I did not in saying 
that deny that one must first know what thought, existence and certainty are, and that it is 
impossible that that which thinks should not exist, and so forth. But because these are very 
simple notions, and ones which on their own provide us with no knowledge of  anything that 
exists, I did not think they needed to be listed. (ibid., AT-VIII, 8; CSM-I, 196) 
 
The construction of  the cogito argument in Principles is the same as the one in Discourse, which I 
have examined above. In B1 Descartes acquires “the piece of  knowledge ‘I am thinking, therefore 
I exist’” (art. VII), and determines the ‘I’ as that which the thought alone belongs to (art. VIII); 
that is, B1 is fully sufficient to explain the essence of  the cogito (that even if  one can doubt 
everything, one cannot doubt the existence of  the ‘I’, who doubts everything, and that the ‘I’ is 
a substance whose nature is simply to think and does not depend on any material things). The 
problem, then, is how we should read B2.  
We must note that the present tense is generally used in Principles, but the past tense is used 
in B2. It is in his reply to the Sixth Objection that Descartes ‘did not [...] deny that one must first 
know what thought, existence and certainty are, and that it is impossible that that which thinks 
should not exist, and so forth’. The Sixth Objection states:  
 
[F]rom the fact that we are thinking it does not seem to be entirely certain that we exist. For in 
order to be certain that you are thinking you must know what thought or thinking is, and what 
your existence is; but since you do not yet know what these things are, how can you know that 
you are thinking or that you exist? Thus, neither when you say ‘I am thinking’ nor when you add 




It is true that no one can be certain that he is thinking or that he exists unless he knows what 
thought is and what existence is. But this does not require reflective knowledge, or the kind of  
knowledge that is acquired by means of  demonstrations[...]. It is quite sufficient that we should 
know it by that internal awareness which always precedes reflective knowledge. This inner 
awareness of  one’s thought and existence is so innate in all men that, although we may pretend 
that we do not have it if  we are overwhelmed by preconceived opinions and pay more attention 
to words than to their meanings, we cannot in fact fail to have it. Thus when anyone notices that 
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he is thinking and that it follows from this that he exists, even though he may never before have 
asked what thought is or what existence is, he still cannot fail to have sufficient knowledge of  
them both to satisfy himself  in this regard. (6ae Resp., AT-VII, 422; CSM-II, 285)  
 
Clearly B2 is based on these replies. Considering this, we can see that Descartes expected a similar 
objection to be made to Principles and intended to respond it in advance; that is, B2 is not essential 
to the cogito argument (let us recall that B1 is sufficient to explain the essence of  the cogito), but is 
an additional explanation that Descartes provided—before knowing the cogito one must know the 
premise ‘it is impossible that that which thinks should not exist’—fearing that ‘philosophers 
[who] make the mistake of  employing logical definitions in an attempt to explain what was already 
very simple and self-evident’ (AT-VIII, 8; CSM-I, 195-196) would not understand his argument. 
However, Descartes did not completely concede; he does not admit the precedence of  the general 
notions and proposition as the ground of  the certainty of  the cogito; he just clarifies that he did 
not deny it. Thus, there are two steps in the cogito argument in Principles: to show the cogito as cognitio, 
which cannot be acquired until one goes through the methodological doubt proper to Descartes’s 
system of  philosophy (B1), and to show the general notions and proposition that are not essential 
to acquire the cogito as cognitio, but useful to persuade those who abide by a stubbornly scholastic 
way (B2).  
 
 
3. The Cogito as Conclusio: Reread Conversation with Burman 
 
 
Finally, I deal with the passage in Conversation with Burman, whose manuscript is believed to be a 
copy of  a text by Johannes Clauberg made by an anonymous hand10:  
 
[C1] Before this inference, ‘I am thinking, therefore I exist’, the major ‘whatever thinks exists’ 
can be known; for it is in reality prior to my inference, and my inference [conclusio] depends 
on it. This is why the author says in the Principles that the major premiss comes first, namely 
because implicitly it is always presupposed and prior. [C2] But it does not follow that I am always 
expressly and explicitly aware of  its priority, or that I know it before my inference [conclusio]. 
This is because I am attending only to what I experience within myself—for example, I am 
thinking, therefore I exist’. I do not pay attention in the same way to the general notion ‘whatever 
thinks exists’. As I have explained before, we do not separate out these general propositions 
from the particular instances; rather, it is in the particular instances that we think of  them. (Ent. 
Burm, AT-V, 147; CSMK-III, 333)  
 
This passage is often read as a compromise that arbitrates between the claims that the cogito is 
                                                        




acquired by itself  and that one must know in advance some general notions. In my reading, 
however, it evidently claims that the cogito is acquired by itself.  
Here, we focus on the term ‘inference [conclusio]’, which appears twice (C1/C2). Although it 
is impossible for us to inspect whether or not the term was used by Descartes himself, there 
seems to be a great possibility that the phrase ‘my inference’, which is used for the first time (C1) 
has a different meaning from the one that is used for the second time (C2). On the one hand, 
‘my inference’ in C1 indicates a conclusion of  deductive reasoning, for the explanation in C1 is 
concerned with B2, where Descartes states that one must know in advance some general notions 
before acquiring the cogito as propositio (‘This is why the author [Descartes] says in the Principles 
[...]’). In brief, B2 provides an additional explanation to B1 for those who abide by a stubbornly 
scholastic way, and C1 further explains B2. On the other hand, ‘my inference’ in C2 indicates a 
conclusion or result of  a series of  metaphysical processes: that one tries to think everything false 
and withdraw one’s mind from the senses and from all preconceived opinions (cf. A1/Med., CSM-
II, 8/P.Ph., CSM-I, 193-194), and notes by doing so that one is thinking and that it follows from 
this that one exists, even though one may never before have asked what thought is or what 
existence is (cf. A1/6ae Resp., CSM-II, 285/B1). It is important here that the claim that the cogito 
is ‘what I experience within myself ’ (C2) corresponds to the one that one acquires the cogito by 
‘experiencing in [one’s] own case that it is impossible that [one] should think without existing’ in 
the Second Reply (AT-VII, 140–141). Thus, C2 provides an additional explanation for the Second 
Reply, where the cogito is said to be something self-evident by a simple intuition of  the mind, not 
something deduced by means of  a syllogism. Moreover, at the end of  C2 Descartes calls 
‘Whatever thinks exists’ a general proposition and ‘I am thinking, therefore I exist’ a particular 
instance (not a particular proposition); that is, the asymmetry between the cogito (knowledge of particular 
thing, knowledge of particular proposition, or particular instance) and the premise (a general 
proposition) is consistent in the Second Reply (1641), the letter to Clerselier (1646), and Conversation 





The following table summarizes the text analysis provided above:  
 
A1 A2 2ae Resp. B1 
Cogito Argument NON-Cogito Argument Cogito Argument Cogito Argument 
No general propositions 
 
‘In order to think it is 
necessary to exist’ 
No general proposition 
 
No general proposition 
B2 To Clerselier C1 C2 
Cogito Argument Cogito Argument Supplement to B2 Cogito Argument 
‘It is impossible that that 
which thinks should not 
exist’ 
No general propositions 
 
‘Whatever thinks exists’ 
 





It is evident from the text analysis in this paper that Descartes completely and consistently considers 
the cogito as what is known by itself  (by a simple intuition of  the mind or by experience) in the 
corpus of  his works, except in A2, B2, and C1. Substantially, however, it is only in B2 that 
Descartes suggests a premise for the cogito; A2 does not deal with the cogito itself  but introduces 
the general rule that the things one conceives very clearly and very distinctly are all true (In the 
Second Meditation he rephrases the misleading description in A2 and introduces the same rule 
without relying on any general proposition); C1 is a supplement to B2, and the main claim in the 
passage in Conversation is that the cogito is ‘what I experience within myself ’ (C2), which 
corresponds to the Second Reply, which states that the cogito is known by experiencing in one’s own 
case that it is impossible that one should think without existing. Further, B2 has a strategic 
consideration for philosophers who conform to a stubbornly scholastic way and ‘make the mistake 
of  employing logical definitions in an attempt to explain what was already very simple and self-
evident’. In B2 Descartes sets a premise to the cogito to persuade them, and calls it propositio to 
distinguish it from the cogito as cognitio in B1, which is known in one’s own case.  
Considering these arguments, we can no longer find inconsistencies in Descartes’s 
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